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Can we reduce our implicit prejudice toward persons with disability?  
The challenge of meditation 
 
Abstract 
The present research further extends recent data revealing implicit attitude towards persons 
with disability, with the aim to explore if meditation practice can reduce automatic mental 
processes initiating prejudice. Forty adult experienced meditators and 34 meditation-naïve 
individuals performed an evaluative priming task. None of them presented any disability. 
Results show important discrepancies between control and meditation practicing participants: 
subliminal disability-priming inhibited evaluation of positive words and facilitated evaluation 
of negative words in the control group, thus revealing the presence of an implicit prejudice 
toward people with disability. In the meditator group, a quite different pattern of results 
emerged:  disability-priming did not affect the evaluation of words, whether positive or 
negative. These findings suggest that meditation practice could deter automatized 
categorization. They provide a hopeful message in the limited current armamentarium for 
decreasing negative attitudes towards persons with disability. 
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Stereotyping and prejudice involve reflexive and habitual patterns of cognitive and 
emotional reactivities, which implicate both controlled and automatic processes (Blair & 
Banaji, 1996; Devine, 1989). Traditionally, researchers in social psychology assess 
stereotypes and prejudice using explicit questionnaire measures that require participants to 
report their judgment of the target group, usually by marking a rating scale. However, one 
fundamental problem with such self-report measures is that they are transparent to the 
respondent, and therefore sensitive to social desirability concerns. In order to present 
themselves in a favorable way, many people may not reveal their counter-normative attitudes 
when asked about socially sensitive issues. In this case, their positive evaluations would not 
manifest themselves when examining implicit evaluations. Implicit evaluations operate in an 
automatic way, and differ from explicit measures insofar as they are generally assumed to be 
uncontrolled, unintentional, unconscious, and requiring limited cognitive resources (Bargh, 
1994; De Houwer, 2006; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). Because implicit evaluations 
operate outside of awareness and intentional control, they limit socially desirable responding, 
and promise to better measure the respondents’ “true” attitudes and beliefs.  
Contributing to this vein of research, Rohmer and Louvet (2012a) have conducted 
studies to assess implicit stereotype associated with persons with disability. Handling a 
Lexical Decision Task, a sequential priming technique specifically appropriated to assess 
implicit stereotyping, participants subliminally primed with disability (the international 
pictogram of disability) have to decide whether a letter sequence is a word or not. The target 
words were traits denoting personal or professional qualities. The more the target word is 
perceived as related with a person with disability, the faster participants are able to identify 
the target word. Results clearly revealed discrepancies between implicit and self-report 
evaluations. In particular, the authors highlighted an ambivalent stereotype associated with 
disability at the explicit level: negative on professional characteristics but positive on personal 




qualities. However, this mixed stereotype was no more ambivalent at an implicit level: all 
positive traits were inhibited after the disability-prime. Discrepancies between explicit and 
implicit attitude can be explained by societal pressure against prejudice and discrimination. 
Overt negative attitudes toward persons with disability are unacceptable, these persons 
belonging to a strongly normatively protected group. Consequently, positive evaluations on 
personal qualities are deliberately endorsed as an over-compensation strategy based on the 
motivation to appear ‘politically correct’ (Dambrun & Guimond, 2004). By contrast, the 
implicit level gives people a reduced opportunity to control their answers in a socially 
desirable way and the automatic prejudice towards disability was then unambiguously 
revealed.  
These automatized mental reactions can lead to negative outcomes. Several lines of 
research have highlighted their broad influence on subsequent judgments, emotion, decision-
making and behaviors (for review see Ferguson, 2007).  This could explain why policies 
promoting equal opportunities to persons with disability fail to ensure social participation 
among these persons (WHO, 2011).  
Faced with this upsetting statement, the following question then arises: Would it be 
possible to master our automatic evaluations? By definition, automatic processes are assumed 
to be autonomous, namely out of respondents’ control. However, the last ten years of findings 
in attitude research has disproved the conception that automatic responses were just fixed, 
inevitable stimulus triggered reactions. Rather, consistent with the Bargh’s (1994) concept of 
‘conditional automaticity’, the notion of contextual as well as goal-dependent automaticity 
has emerged. In particular, accumulated research has shown that implicit attitudes and 
evaluations can be moderated by different contextual parameters, such as participants’ 
objectives or motivation, object-relevant information or even social influence pressure (e.g., 
Chartrand, van Baaren, & Bargh, 2006; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Karpinski & Hilton, 




2001; Maddux, Barden, Brewer, & Petty, 2005; Mitchell, Nosek & Banaji, 2003; Moskowitz, 
Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999; Wittenbrick, Judd, & Park, 2001). Thus, at least some 
automatic cognitive processes appear to be malleable, only occurring when certain 
preconditions are met.  Therefore, we believe that the subject deserves to be questioned 
otherwise: Can we learn to become unresponsive to such contextual parameters? Would it be 
possible not to engage in automatic evaluations to avoid prejudicial outcomes? We 
hypothesized that the meditation practice would allow such an opportunity. Indeed, despite its 
various types, meditation practice involves basically a self-focus attempt to avoid the stream 
of thoughts, intending to reach what Cardoso, de Souza, Camano and Leite (2004, 2008) call 
the ‘logic relaxation’, namely the capacity to stop analyzing, judging or creating any type of 
expectation regarding the ongoing process or its effects. Thus, by improving self-regulation, 
by regulating attention and awareness and fostering executive control, meditation practice 
should allow people to overcome impulses and override automatic functioning. This was 
suggested for mindfulness, a specific practice or state of openness and nonjudgmental 
awareness of the present moment (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008; 
Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Ostafin, Kassman, & Wessel, 2013; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013). The aim of 
our research was to test the hypothesis that meditation practice can discontinue automatic 
reactivity in a context of implicit activation of categorical stereotype. In the field of social 
psychology, only one study has just start to test how mindfulness training could reduce 
implicit reactions towards discriminated populations (Lueke & Gibson, 2014). Using an 
Implicit Association Task (IAT), these authors showed a decrease in implicit race and age 
bias. However, the IAT paradigm seems to violate one of the fundamental features of 
automatic procedures, the controllability: participants may become aware of what is assessing 
during the task (Dijkerhuis & Bargh, 2001). Consequently, this procedure could not be 
assumed to be better than explicit measures to assess prejudice and predict behavior (Oswald, 




Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013). In contrast with the IAT procedure, sequential 
priming procedures are specifically designed to assess the likehood that some social 
categories receives automatic activation from memory (without conscious awareness, 
controllability and intent), through the use of subliminal primes, backwards masks, or short 
stimuli onset asynchrony between primes and targets (Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 
2007; de Wit & Kinoshita, 2014; Neely, 1977). Then, using such a sequential priming 
procedure, we aimed to verify whether meditation practice could reduce the influence of a 
disability-priming stimulus presented outside of conscious awareness on subsequent 
evaluative answers.  
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-four French people participated in this study, on a voluntary basis. They were 
French speaking and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of them presented any 
disability. Forty of them (26 females, Mage = 56, SD = 11.74) were experienced meditators (at 
least 1 year of meditation experience), recruited from local yoga centers offering sessions of 
attentional meditation practice focused on breath and bodily sensory perception. These 
participants practice together at least once a week and regularly alone at home. They were 
assessed directly after a meditation session. Thirty four participants were meditation-naïve 
(control group) and recruited in respect to age and gender of meditators (24 females, Mage = 55, 
SD = 10.41). They were recruited among meditators friends and colleagues, and reported 
having no experience in any kind of meditation, yoga or relaxation techniques. 
Measures  
Implicit prejudice was measured following a simplified version of the evaluative 
sequential priming paradigm (Fazio et al., 1995; Wittenbrink et al., 2001). Participants were 
first presented with priming stimuli outside of conscious awareness and then asked to 




indicate, as quickly and as accurately as possible, whether target words appearing on a 
computer screen had a positive or a negative valence. The priming stimuli for this task 
involved symbolic categorical pictures: a person with disability, the international disability 
pictogram, or without disability, the international pedestrian pictogram (Dionne, Gainforth, 
O’Malley, & Latimer-Cheung, 2013; Pruett & Chan, 2006; Rohmer & Louvet, 2012a). A pilot 
study indicated that the international disability pictogram is unanimously associated to 
disability whereas the international pedestrian pictogram evokes somebody who is walking 
(Rohmer & Louvet, 2012b). In order to obtain baseline responses, a neutral prime condition 
was introduced (a square). Each prime was followed by target words which varied in valence: 
six positive words (freedom, joy, happiness, holidays, pleasure, smile) and six negative words 
(agony, cancer, crime, rape, supplice, war). These words were pretested for their valence 
(Rohmer & Louvet, 2012a) and fully crossed with the three primes, the order being 
randomized. Participants had to judge the evaluative connotation (positive/negative) of each 
word. Response latencies recorded for each prime-target combination indicate the degree with 
which people relate the categorical picture with positive or negative valence.  
Procedure  
Participants were told that they would take part in a task of verbal fluency. The task 
was presented on a monitor. Participants were asked to focus on a fixation cross presented in 
the center of the screen for 1000 ms. This cross was followed by the prime presented very 
briefly and synchronized to the screen refresh rate (17 ms). Prime size was precisely 5 cm  
5 cm. The prime was overwritten by a backward mask (a geometrical figure) for 250 ms to 
prevent conscious identification of the prime (de Wit & Kinoshita, 2014). Finally, a target 
adjective was presented for 250 ms in white 18-point Arial font on a black background. 
Participants had to indicate whether this word is positive or negative, by pressing response 
keys respectively labeled ‘+’ and ‘-’. Ten practice trials were presented with an experimenter 




on hand to provide assistance before responding to the experimental trials. Participants 
received different random orders of trials. Response latency measures after each categorical 
prime were subtracted from the response latency following the neutral prime. Thus, larger 
values indicate greater response facilitation by the categorical prime. In line with literature, 
the stronger the mental association between the categorical prime (positively or negatively 
perceived) and the target word (of positive or negative valence), the higher the facilitation 
score will be (Wentura & Degner, 2010; Wittenbrink, 2007).  
Before participants were debriefed and thanked, they were asked whether they had 
seen something appearing on the screen prior to the target words in order to ensure that they 
were not aware of the priming. Disability had not been identified by any participant. 
Results 
Results are based only on correct responses. Errors and extreme outliers were recoded 
as missing values. We collapsed across the six positive and the six negative items given each 
prime. Following recent recommendations (Cumming, 2014), we tested planned contrasts 
based on our main assumptions, rather than reporting omnibus analyses of variance. All 
means are given in Table 1. On the basis of facilitation differences as a function of group 
(control versus meditator), prime (with disability versus without disability), and valence 
(positive versus negative), the first factor varying between-participants, the others varying 
within participants, we computed several contrasts of interest. The first contrast captures 
generalized prejudice, in the both group. More specifically, this contrast examines whether 
negatively valenced items are more facilitated by the disability prime than are positively 
valenced items, and whether the reverse is true for the without-disability prime. The two 
following contrasts capture evaluation separately for each prime. More specifically, a second 
contrast examines whether negative items are more facilitated by the disability prime than are 




positive ones. Finally, the third contrast examines whether positive items are more facilitated 
by the without-disability prime than are negative ones. 
The first contrast suggested generalized prejudice toward persons with disability in the 
control group (F(1, 33) = 2.99,  p < .08). The cell means make clear that, following the with-
disability prime, negative items showed larger facilitation (M = 0.28) than positive items (M = 
7.90), whereas this pattern was reversed following the without-disability prime (Mpositive = 
9.33; Mnegative = -10.45). This result was no longer true when focusing on the meditator group 
(F(1, 39) = 0.15,  p =.70) : following both disability- and without-disability prime, positive 
items (Mwith-disability = -9.54; Mwith-disability = -0.46) were more facilitated than negative items 
(Mwith-disability = -33.28; Mwith-disability = -18.45). The two following contrasts compared 
evaluations in the meditator group and the control group, separately for disability- and 
without-disability prime. Results showed that prejudice effect was attributable solely to 
disability prime (F(1, 72) = 2.17,  p < .10). Although this contrast failed to reach a 
conventional level of significance, the cell means clearly suggested that negative items 
showed larger inhibition in the meditator group (M = -33.28) than in the control group (M = 
0.28). No effect was found for without-disability prime (F(1, 72) = 0.01,  p = .92), suggesting 
that this label (persons without disability) cannot be considered as a meaningful categorical 
prime (Rohmer & Louvet, 2009). 
Insert Table 1 
Discussion 
By extending previous studies showing implicit prejudice against persons with 
disability, the main purpose of our research was to test whether meditation practice could 
reduce such implicit prejudice. In the growing literature on implicit attitudes, only few studies 
focused on prejudice against persons with disability (Dionne et al., 2013; Kurita & Kusumi, 
2009; Pruett & Chan, 2006; Rohmer & Louvet, 2012a). As far as we know, there has been 




only one attempt to study the impact of mindfulness on implicit reactions towards minorities. 
Results indicated that brief mindfulness training enabled reduction of implicit bias against 
black or old people (Lueke & Gibson, 2014). However, this pioneered study conducted 
among college students used an IAT procedure which did not ensure uncontrollability of 
answers (Dijkerhuis & Bargh, 2001). Using a sequential priming paradigm specifically 
designed to assess automatic (without conscious awareness, controllability and intent) 
processes (Boccato et al., 2007; Neely, 1977), we compared for the first time implicit 
prejudice against persons with disability in adult population practicing or not regular 
meditation. Results highlight discrepancies between the two populations. In non-meditator 
population, positive items were more facilitated than negative items after a without-disability 
prime, whereas this effect was reversed following a disability prime. Thus, our results support 
the previous work showing an implicit prejudice related to disability, but using an evaluative 
task instead of an implicit association test (Pruett & Chan, 2006) or a decision lexical task 
(Rohmer & Louvet, 2012a), and specially involving a middle age population instead of 
students. For meditation practitioners, a quite different pattern emerged: disability is less 
associated with negativity. Indeed, negative words were always inhibited, even after priming 
disability. Thus, in line with our hypothesis, meditation practice seemed to reduce the 
influence of a disability-priming stimulus presented outside of conscious awareness on 
subsequent negative evaluative answers. In addition, the automatic treatments received by 
disability- and without-disability primes appear to be equivalent in our meditation 
practitioners, results highlighting an absence of prime effect in this group.  
In overall, data obtained in this study support a de-automatizing function of meditation 
practice, which might reduce either or both the impact of unconscious priming or the 
automatic activation of mental processes initiating negative prejudice towards disability. 
Thus, our results are in line with recent suggestions that practices which monitor attention and 




foster mental control, as suggested for mindfulness, should help to override automatic 
functioning (Chambers et al., 2008; Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; Ostafin, Kassman, & 
Wessel, 2013; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013). The attentional meditation practiced by our 
participants within the Hatha yoga tradition, that is the repeated placement of attention on the 
physical sensations of breathing while clearing the mind of other thoughts, very likely 
improves awareness and conscious attention to the present moment. Such processes should 
discontinue automatic inference processing shown in priming and stereotyping (Kang, 
Gruber, & Gray, 2013). Indeed, previous findings suggested that mindfulness can minimize 
the impact of priming and the biased influence of past experience on thoughts and behavior 
(Lueke & Gibson, 2014; Ostafin & Kassman, 2012). For example, a less susceptibility to a 
priming manipulation has been described for individuals with higher levels of dispositional 
mindfulness (Radel, Sarrazin, Legrain, & Gobancé, 2009), and mindfulness training in a 
naturalistic classroom setting has been shown to decrease racial stereotyping and 
discrimination against children with physical disability (Langer, Bashner, & Chanowitz, 1985; 
Lillis & Hayes, 2007).  
Other mechanisms could be considered to explain our results. Meditation has been 
shown to enhance positive emotions and reduce negative ones (Bitner, Hillman, Victor, & 
Walsch, 2002). A body of research has revealed that feelings or emotions provide useful 
information for subsequent judgments and interactions. This “feeling-as-information” 
perspective (Schwarz, 1990) has shown that experience of positive affects would predict 
positive consequences on intergroup cognitions and behaviors. In agreement with Cardoso’s 
perspective, meditation practice enables to reduce rumination of past experiences and 
cultivates the cessation of elaborative thoughts (Cardoso et al., 2008; Wells, 2006); 
consequently meditators could use affects as heuristics to deal with the present moment. Then, 
the generalized positive affective disposition of meditation practitioners could reduce the 




strength of past automatic association between disability and negativity. In addition, recent 
neuroimaging research evidenced that meditation practitioners exhibit significantly different 
neural responses in cognitive and affective brain circuitry than non-meditators (Aftanas & 
Golosheykin, 2005; Cahn & Polish, 2006; Gootjes, Franken, & Van Strien, 2011). More 
precisely, an attentional meditation practice similar to that of our participants can moderate 
neural emotional interference on a cognitively demanding task (Froelinger, Garland, Modlin, 
& McClernon, 2012). Thus, the modulation of emotion-cognition interactions by meditation 
practice could explain why disability-prime did not affect subsequent negative responses 
among our meditator participants.  
This study might stimulate interest in further research on the use of meditation practice 
to reduce activation of negative implicit prejudice. However, it contains some potential 
limitations. Notably, this research focused on people who deliberately chose an approach of 
personal development and might be more open to others and less prejudiced than the 
mainstream population. Then, the preliminary correlational findings between meditation 
practice and prejudice reduction merit to be more firmly established. Nevertheless, some 
randomized studies in which mindfulness state has been experimentally induced support our 
results (Djikic, Langer, & Stapleton, 2008; Langer et al., 1985; Lueke & Gibson, 2014). For 
example, listening to a 10-min audiotape that focused participants on mindfulness reduced the 
implicit racial bias expressed as compared with listening to a control audio condition (Lueke 
& Gibson, 2014). Yet, there can be no guarantee that immediate priming could positively 
impact subsequent behaviors in real social interactions. Thus, it would be relevant to conduct 
longitudinal studies in order to test the same people before and after (shorter- and longer-
term) their involvement in a meditation practice. This would allow assessing whether these 
people express different attitudes at an explicit and implicit level, and whether the gap 
generally observed between explicit and implicit evaluations can be reduced through 




meditation practice training. In a complementary manner, such a study will allow to address 
the important issue concerning whether meditation practice may promote non-discriminatory 
behaviors.  
To conclude, further research is required to precise the effects of meditation practice 
on mental to behavioral de-automatization. However, this study provides a hopeful message 
in the limited current armamentarium for addressing implicit prejudice toward persons with 
disability. Meditation may have an interesting role in alleviation of this actual societal 
problem. 
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